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Abstract 
This paper reports the results of a research project which examines the feasibility of developing a 
machine-independent audit trail analyser (MIATA). MIATA is a knowledge based system which 
performs intelligent analysis of operating system audit trails. Such a system is proposed as a 
decision support tool for auditors when assessing the risk of unauthorised user activity in multi-user 
computer systems. It is also relevant to the provision of a continuous assurance service to clients by 
internal and external auditors. 
 
Monitoring user activity in system audit trails manually is impractical because of the vast quantity 
of events recorded in those audit trails. However, if done manually, an expert security auditor 
would be needed to look for 2 main types of events - user activity rejected by the system's security 
settings (failed actions) and user's behaving abnormally (e.g. unexpected changes in activity such 
as the purchasing clerk attempting to modify payroll data). A knowledge based system is suited to 
applications that require expertise to perform well-defined, yet complex, monitoring activities (e.g. 
controlling nuclear reactors and detecting intrusions in computer systems).  
 
To permit machine-independent intelligent audit trail analysis, an anomaly-detection approach is 
adopted. Time series forecasting methods are used to develop and maintain the user profile 
database (knowledge base) that allows identification of users with rejected behaviour as well as 
abnormal behaviour. The knowledge based system maintains this knowledge base and permits 
reporting on the potential intruder threats (summarized in Table 1). 
 
The intelligence of the MIATA system is its ability to handle audit trails from any system, its 
knowledge base capturing rejected user activity and detecting anomalous activity, and its reporting 
capabilities focusing on known methods of intrusion. MIATA also updates user profiles and 
forecasts of behaviour on a daily basis. As such, it also 'learns' from changes in user behaviour. 
 
The feasibility of generating machine-independent audit trail records, and the applicability of the 
anomaly-detection approach and time series forecasting methods are demonstrated using three case 
studies. These results support the proposal that developing a machine-independent audit trail analyser 
is feasible. Such a system will be an invaluable aid to an auditor in detecting potential computer 
intrusions and monitoring user activity.  
 
 
 
 
KEY WORDS: Audit trails, intrusion detection, continuous assurance. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
Opportunities for new assurance services in an information technology environment have been 
recognised by the AICPA Special Committee on Assurance Services (SCAS) [AICPA (1996)]: 
 
Assurance services are independent professional services that improve the quality of 
information, or its context, for decision makers. It follows from this definition that new 
service opportunities must arise from the changing needs of decision makers. Information 
technology is changing those needs and therefore creating opportunities for new services. 
 
The report produced by SCAS also forecasts a change in the timeliness of assurance services. It 
recognised that users may require audits of data on a “continuous basis” or on a “just-in-time 
basis”, depending on the needs for decision making. Consequently, an evolution in information 
system assurance services is predicted to match these needs. Research interest in continuous 
auditing and assurance has been growing steadily over the past few years [Alles, Kogan & 
Vasarhelyi (2002); Rezaee et.al. (2002). 
 
This paper deals with the feasibility of developing a knowledge based system to support a 
continuous assurance service. This research assesses the feasibility of developing a machine-
independent audit trail analyser (MIATA) for on-line, multi-user, computer systems, which will 
support continuous auditing of computer user activity.   
 
Threats to on-line systems, referred to herein as ‘intrusions’, have attracted considerable attention in the 
research literature [Denning et. al. (1987); Smaha (1988); Liepins & Vaccaro (1989); Lunt et. al. 
(1990); Winkler & Landry (1992); Lunt (1993), Mounji & Le Charlier (1997); Asaka (1999); Daniels 
& Spafford (1999)], Ye & Chen (2001), and Ye, Ehiabor & Zhang (2002). Prior research has focused 
on exploration of various approaches (eg. Pattern matching, stochastic models) to intrusion detection 
and their application to specific computer platforms (eg. Unix, Unisys). This paper contributes to this 
literature by: 
 
1. Proposing a machine-independent approach to intrusion detection using a knowledge based 
system (KBS) for analyzing audit trails; 
2. Demonstrating the feasibility of generating machine-independent audit trail records from 
disparate computer environments; 
3. Demonstrating the suitability of an anomaly-detection approach to intrusion detection using 
time series methods of forecasting; and 
4.  Illustrating that data structures for MIATA can be developed imposing minimal storage 
requirements. 
 
 
2.0 BACKGROUND 
 
This research is concerned with threats to the availability, confidentiality and integrity of data [OECD 
(1992);  NCSC (1985)]. On-line computer systems permit remote users to access programs and data. In 
such an environment, there is always the threat that users may obtain access to the private resources of 
other users and that intruders may infiltrate the system and obtain unauthorised access to both public 
and private resources. Loss of availability, confidentiality or integrity may result from such intrusions. 
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Various methods of intrusion have been used to obtain unauthorised access to on-line systems [Stoll 
(1988);  Spafford (1989); Lunt (1993); Pfleeger (1997) and Proctor & Byrnes (2002)].  These methods 
include: ‘attempted break-ins’, ‘masquerading’, and ‘browsing’. Attempted break-ins, or password 
guessing involves the intruder attempting repeatedly to guess a target user's password. With 
masquerading, the intruder logs in to the system as a target user, using his or her user identification 
(user-id) and password. The intruder may act in the name of the target user, accessing available files 
and programs.  Where the target user has supervisor privileges, the intruder may use system utilities to 
modify the security characteristics of the system, such as adding new users, changing passwords and 
inflating privileges.  Browsing refers to attempts by authorised users to obtain private information 
(such as user-ids) to assist in the above methods, or to perform unauthorised functions, such as 
accessing sensitive data files, changing user privileges, printing/displaying large numbers of files and 
resource hogging. 
 
Four main safeguards against computer intrusions can be distinguished [Pfleeger (1997); Allen (2001); 
Krause & Tipton (2001) and Proctor & Byrnes (2002). Authentication is a mechanism for determining 
whether a user is authorised to use the system.  Authorisation is given to users to enter the system in the 
form of a user-id and password.  The user-id identifies the user.  The password is a means of 
authenticating the user's identification.  Other authentication techniques are available including 
biometric methods which recognize personal characteristics such as hand geometry and eye retinas.  
Access Control mechanisms aim to ensure that a user performs only authorised activities once granted 
access to the system.  Each requested action by a user involving an object (file, program) is compared 
with an authority database.  This database can be visualised as an "access control matrix" which 
specifies each user's privileges (owner, read, write, execute) in relation to particular objects. 
Cryptography involves encoding data into a form preventing outsiders from understanding their 
content if unauthorised access is gained.  Cryptography can be applied to the protection of data in files, 
especially password files, and messages being transmitted across networks. Audit Trail Analysis can 
provide a powerful tool for detecting unauthorised activity and anomalous user activity.  The above 
intrusion methods may leave evidence recorded in these audit trails of events such as repeated failed 
logins, logins at unusual times, changes in patterns of workstation, file and command usage by 
individual users and across the whole system, and repeated unsuccessful attempts to access files and 
execute commands, particularly those of a sensitive nature. A knowledge based system for audit trail 
analysis can provide the basis for a continuous audit assurance service by internal and external auditors 
by directing attention to potential intrusions and unusual changes in user activity. 
 
 
 
3.0 A KNOWLEDGE BASED SYSTEM FOR AUDIT TRAIL ANALYSIS 
 
The study of knowledge based systems has emerged from the field of artificial intelligence and is 
concerned with the investigation of methods and techniques for constructing computer systems that 
possess problem-solving expertise in specialised domains.  Such systems have been developed over the 
past twenty years for a range of scientific (eg. medical and engineering) and business (eg. taxation and 
audit) applications [see Connell (1987);  Abdolmohammadi (1987);  Denning (1987);  Quinlan (1989); 
Hellerstein, Klein & Milliken (1990); van Dijk & Williams (1990); Garcia & Chien (1992); 
Jagannathan et. al. (1993)]; and Tzafestas (1997)]. Typically, a KBS application is designed to make 
expertise (from one or more experts) in a given domain available to users (both experts and non-
experts) at distributed locations in a consistent, uniform manner. Such applications may also be 
designed to handle well-defined, yet complex, monitoring activities (eg. controlling nuclear reactors). 
Intrusion detection in computer systems is a domain well-suited to a KBS solution, as discussed below. 
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Audit trail records typically provide a very low-level description of system activity.  Reporting 
facilities for audit trails are usually very limited and ‘instance-based’. These facilities allow an auditor 
to generate reports of all instances of specified activities.  For example, all operator actions, all accesses 
to the payroll master files, or all failed logins can be reported. However, the opportunities for detecting 
intrusions are very limited. 
 
How would one detect password guessing?  A particular user's account may have been targeted by an 
intruder.  Knowing the target's user-id, the intruder may attempt to log-in using the target's 
identification and then guess the password.  Such a break-in attempt could be detected by identifying 
all users that had any failed logins in a given day, or (since users frequently miskey their passwords) an 
anomalous number of failed logins.  In addition, such attempts may be perpetrated using a workstation 
different from that accessed normally by the target.  Selecting users with anomalous failed logins and 
anomalous workstation usage would identify quickly users that may have been targeted for password 
guessing.  It is clear that these simple notions are beyond the scope of instance-based reporting 
facilities which can only provide lists of events that meet specified criteria.  These products provide no 
capability for relating a user's activity on a given day to the user's historical behaviour.  A knowledge 
based system, however, can maintain individual user profiles or forecasts of user behaviour that allow 
the detection of such anomalous behaviour.   
 
 
  INSERT FIGURE 1  ABOUT HERE 
 
 
A model of the processing system underlying MIATA is illustrated in Figure 1.  Audit trail records are 
generated by the target system providing a record of successful and failed user activity - login, file 
access, command execution, etc.  A machine-dependent preprocessor reads the audit trail records and 
generates records in a normalised, machine-independent format, herein referred to as ‘normalised audit 
event’ (NAE) records.  A profile database is maintained that represents forecasts of expected user 
behaviour, based on actual behaviour and prior forecast errors.  The machine-independent audit trail 
analyser (MIATA) reads NAE records, records daily activity, compares actual activity with forecasts, 
provides a user interface that identifies anomalous activity and potential intrusions, and updates 
profiles. 
 
A KBS designed to analyse audit trails offers significant advantages.  Such a system can facilitate the 
effective investigation of user activity.  The system can also increase the sophistication of the analysis 
that can be performed routinely.  The constraints in audit trail analysis of handling large volumes of 
low-level descriptions of activity using instance-based reporting facilities can be overcome using such 
a system.  Combinations of activity, frequency of activity and unexpected user behaviour can be 
analysed, and attempted and successful intrusions can be detected.  This level of software support for 
the auditor permits the development of a framework for audit trail analysis that can be applied 
consistently on a daily basis.  Such analysis could identify the need for user training and could 
encourage an installation to develop explicit security policies concerning acceptable and unacceptable 
user behaviour.   
 
A machine-independent KBS for audit trail analysis can be extremely valuable to organisations with 
multi-platform environments.  Such organisations need an organisation-wide audit trail analysis 
solution.  A machine-independent tool can provide a single, consistent method for analysing audit trails 
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from different systems and facilitate centralised control over computing resources [Rezaee et. al. 
(2002)]. 
 
 
4.0 PRIOR RESEARCH  
The foundation paper in the area of audit trail analysis and intrusion detection, was Denning (1987). 
This paper introduced a number of concepts which are fundamental to the development of MIATA.  
Denning (1987: 223) developed an intrusion-detection model, consisting of six main components: 
subjects - initiators of activity on a target system - normally users; objects -  resources managed by the 
system - files, commands, devices, etc.; audit records – generated by the target system in response to 
actions performed or attempted by subjects on objects - user login, command execution, file access, 
etc.; profiles - structures characterising the behaviour of subjects with respect to objects in terms of 
statistical metrics and models of observed activity; anomaly records: -generated when abnormal 
behaviour is detected; and activity rules - actions taken when some condition is satisfied, which update 
profiles, detect abnormal behaviour, relate anomalies to suspected intrusions, and produce reports. 
 
Denning (1987: 224-226) proposed alternative methods for developing activity profiles.  Such profiles 
characterise the behaviour of a given subject with respect to a given object, representing a definition of 
normal activity and a means of detecting anomalous activity.  Observed behaviour can be characterised 
in terms of statistical metrics (such as event counters, interval timers, and resource measures) and 
models (such as operational models that compare observations against fixed thresholds, mean and 
standard deviation models that define an observation as abnormal if it falls outside a confidence 
interval that is a specified number of standard deviations from the mean, multivariate models that 
incorporate correlations among two or more metrics, markov process models, and time series models).  
 
Early audit trail analysers have been designed to analyse audit records of a single computer system 
environment.  Examples include the Standard Audit File of & Pinnis (1984), SRI's early model of the 
Intrusion Detection Expert System (IDES) [Denning et. al. (1987); and Lunt et. al. (1988)], Haystack 
Laboratories' HAYSTACK System [Smaha (1988)], Los Alamos National Laboratory's Wisdom & 
Sense (W&S) [Liepins & Vaccaro (1989)], AT&T's COMPUTERWATCH [Dowell & Ramstedt 
(1990)] and ASAX [Habra et. al. (1992)].  These projects have focused on exploration of various 
approaches (eg. pattern matching, stochastic models) to intrusion detection and their application to 
specific computer platforms (eg. Unix, Unisys and VMS). Many of these approaches have been applied 
to networks of computers [Lunt et. al. (1990); Snapp et. al. (1991); Winkler & Landry (1992); 
Jagannathan et. al. (1993); Mounji & Le Charlier (1997); Daniels & Spafford (1999); and MIT’s 
DARPA Intrusion Detection Evaluation Project (http://www.ll.mit.edu/IST/ideval/index.html) [Haines, 
et. al. (2001)]. These papers provide little justification for nor detailed information on the statistical 
methods used. Little documentation is provided of attempts to analyze actual user audit trails in order 
to justify and test the methods selected. 
 
This research can be distinguished from earlier research in several ways. A machine-independent 
approach to intrusion detection is proposed using a knowledge based system (KBS) for analyzing audit 
trails. The feasibility of generating machine-independent audit trail records from disparate computer 
environments is demonstrated. Case studies of actual user activity are used to demonstrate the 
suitability of an anomaly-detection approach to intrusion detection. Time series methods of forecasting 
produce results satisfying ‘goodness of fit’ requirements. This research also illustrates that data 
structures for MIATA can be developed imposing minimal storage requirements. 
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5.0 MACHINE-INDEPENDENT AUDIT TRAIL RECORDS 
 
The existence of an audit trail mechanism in computer systems is necessary before intelligent audit trail 
analysis can be contemplated.  The primary pronouncement guiding operating system development 
over the past fifteen years has been the Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC), 
[NCSC (1985)]. The NCSC, previously the Department of Defense (DoD) Computer Security Center, 
developed the TCSEC to serve as a basis for rating computer systems.  The TCSEC was published 
originally in 1983 and was adopted as a DoD Standard in 1985.  
 
The TCSEC defines four divisions:  D, C, B, and A, arranged in a hierarchy with division D referring 
to Minimal Protection and division A referring to Verified Protection. There are seven levels within 
these four divisions:  D, C1, C2, B1, B2, B3 and A1.  Each level includes all of the security provisions 
of the preceding levels.  Accordingly, C2 security is greater than C1, and A1 is greater than all other 
levels. Pfleeger (1989: 283-287) summarises the distinctions between these ratings. Operating systems 
vary greatly in their security ratings.  Early Unix systems would be rated at C1 [see Farrow (1991: 16], 
although more recent versions of Unix have achieved higher ratings [Santa Cruz Operation (1992: 268-
287)].  The Honeywell Multics and Scomp operating systems have been rated B2 and A1 respectively 
[Pfleeger (1989: 286)]. TCSEC classes C2 through A1 have an audit trail requirement that a user's 
actions should be open to scrutiny by means of an audit. 
 
Five purposes of the audit trail mechanism can be identified  [Datapro (1988: 103)]. Auditors may 
review patterns of access by users to objects (eg. dial-up lines), discover attempts to bypass security,  or 
to leverage privileges. Audit trails also can act as a deterrent against attempts to bypass security and 
provide evidence of system misuse. 
 
The TCSEC class C2 is the first level with an audit trail requirement.  The C2 requirements are 
common to all the levels above C2.  In order to permit audits to be performed on the basis of individual 
users and objects, the following events are subject to audit at the C2 class [see Datapro  (1988: 105)]: 
use of identification and authentication mechanisms,  introduction of objects into a user's address space, 
deletion of objects from a user's address space, actions taken by computer operators and system 
administrators and/or system security administrators, and all security-relevant events. Security-relevant 
events are defined by the TCSEC as "any event that attempts to change the security state of the system 
(e.g., change discretionary access controls, change the security level of the subject, change user 
password,  etc.).  Also, any event that attempts to violate the security policy of the system (e.g., too 
many attempts to log in,  attempts to violate the mandatory access control limits of a  device, attempts 
to downgrade a file, etc.)". 
 
The following data are to be recorded by the audit trail mechanism at the C2 class [see Datapro (1988: 
105)]: date and time of the event, identification of the subject (eg. user-id), type of event, success or 
failure of the event, origin of the request (eg. workstation ID), name of object introduced, accessed, or 
deleted from a user's address space, and modifications made by the system administrator to the 
user/system  security databaseds. Higher TCSEC classes require additional events to be audited 
[Datapro (1988: 105-6)].  
 
This paper aims to demonstrate the feasibility of machine-independent audit trail analysis.  Since 
operating systems with a TCSEC rating below C2 have no audit trail requirements, the minimal audit 
trail requirements of the C2 class is adopted as the basis for defining a Normalised Audit Event (NAE) 
(and corresponding record format) and for predicting profiles associated with particular intrusions.  
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Accordingly, this generalised representation of user activity is applicable to all operating systems with 
a TCSEC rating of C2 or higher, which include the majority of commercially-available operating 
systems.  For the purposes of this study, each NAE record has the following attributes: date of event, 
time of event, identity of subject (eg. User-id), workstation identification, type of event, identity of the 
object (eg. File) and status of the event (success or failure). 
 
In the MIATA system, a machine-dependent preprocessor is used to generate NAE records from the 
target system's audit trail records.  MIATA reads NAE records and performs audit trail analysis, 
regardless of the target system's hardware/software environment. It is proposed also that intruder 
profiles for known methods of intrusion can be developed from such NAE records of user activity. 
 
The characteristics of the known active methods of intrusion in terms of patterns of observed user 
behaviour may be identified in order to develop a set of intruder profiles. Each audit record identifies 
an event involving a specific subject and object combination.  In addition, the status of each event is 
indicated in terms of success or failure.  The success or failure of an event may be relevant to particular 
methods of intrusion.  A specific method of intrusion may involve also an "anomalous" level of 
activity, that is, a frequency of a specific type of activity (eg. login) per time period that is abnormal for 
the subject in question, or differs significantly from forecasts of that activity for the subject.  
Characteristics of the three active methods of intrusion are discussed below: 
 
1. Password guessing.  The intruder tries repeatedly to guess a user's password.  This method 
requires the intruder to be aware of an authorised user's identification (user-id). A wide range of 
direct methods of password attack have been identified [see Witten (1987)]. However, the 
effectiveness of such methods can be reduced severely where passwords are properly managed. 
Passwords may be obtained by using special software that tries thousands of combinations of 
characters.  Where the target system has limits on the number of unsuccessful login attempts, 
this software can terminate the dial-up session, reconnect and resume the experiment 
automatically.  Password guessing is characterised most likely by an anomalous number of 
failed login attempts by the user, usually associated with changes in workstation usage.  In 
addition, anomalous levels of failed logins for a particular workstation or at the system level 
may indicate that password guessing is occurring.   
 
2. Masquerading as an authorised user.  The intruder may log in to the system employing the 
user-id and password of a target user, or issue commands by using a workstation tapped into 
the user's communication line.  The masquerader may wish to access commands and files used 
frequently by the target user, or use this account as a spring-board into other parts of the 
system.  Masquerading may be indicated by an anomalous number of logins for a user, since 
inactive users are often targeted and since the intruder is also logging-in to the system using the 
same user-id. The target user's workstation usage may appear anomalous, since it is unlikely 
that the intruder can obtain access to the user's normal workstation.  The effectiveness of this 
means of detection depends on whether physical workstation addresses are employed on the 
system. The intruder may attempt to access the system at unusual hours.  Masquerading may 
also be indicated by anomalous file and command usage by the target user (that is, changes in 
the user's patterns of file and command access), or anomalous levels of failed activity, since the 
intruder may attempt to exploit the user's privileges to its limits.  
 
3. Browsing.  A legitimate user attempts to access files or execute commands in an unauthorised 
manner.  The user experiments with the system, testing his or her privileges to access files and 
commands of interest.  Users may attempt also to misuse sensitive files and commands.  
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Browsing by a particular user is characterised most likely by anomalous file and command 
usage, anomalous failed file and command usage, and anomalous levels of failed actions.   
 
Table 1 summarizes the likely activity profiles associated with the three main intrusion methods. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
  
 
The intruder profiles developed above require MIATA to detect anomalous user activity.  Accordingly, 
there are implications for the design of MIATA concerning what events need to be recorded in NAE 
records, what methods are suitable for detecting anomalous user activity and what data series need to 
be maintained and forecast. 
 
The intruder profiles for password guessing, masquerading, and browsing require MIATA to detect 
anomalous activity by users with respect to logins, late logins, failed logins, failed actions, workstation 
usage, file usage, failed file access, command usage and failed command execution.  The NAE record 
format incorporates: date of the event, time of the event, user-id, workstation identification, type of 
event, object-id, and status (success or failure).  The types of events that need to be recorded in the 
NAE to permit audit trail analysis are: login; file creation; file deletion; file rename; file read; file write; 
and command execution. 
 
These events must be extracted from the target system's audit trail records by the machine-dependent 
preprocessor.  Login events will permit login frequency for each user to be computed by MIATA.  The 
time stamp in the NAE record will permit MIATA to detect late logins.  The status (success or failure) 
of an event will permit MIATA to distinguish successful and failed user logins and actions.  The 
workstation identification will permit MIATA to monitor workstation usage by users.  File- and 
command-related events will specify the particular object-id, thereby permitting MIATA to monitor 
file and command usage by users.  Accordingly, sufficient data concerning these event types can be 
collected using NAE records to permit MIATA to detect intrusions and anomalous user activity. 
   
An anomalous level of activity (eg. failed logins) is defined as a frequency of activity per day that is 
abnormal for the particular user. MIATA adopts a forecasting approach to detecting such anomalies.  
In particular, time series methods are evaluated to select a means of generating forecasts and 
confidence intervals for user activity.  A computed frequency of activity will be categorised as 
anomalous if it lies outside the relevant confidence intervals. In addition, to permit MIATA to detect 
anomalous usage of workstations, files and commands, MIATA's user profile database must maintain 
sufficient data to permit forecasts to be generated for individual user's actions involving particular 
workstations, files and commands.   
 
This discussion has focused on known methods of intrusions to computer systems in order to develop 
intruder profiles.  These profiles rely extensively on the ability of audit trail analysis to detect 
anomalous activity by users.  Concentrating on anomalous activity offers several advantages.  System 
misuse may be detected.  Acceptable and unacceptable changes in user interests and behaviour may be 
identified.  Finally, intrusions may be discovered which are novel, that is do not conveniently fall into 
one of the above-described categories. 
 
6.0 ANOMALY DETECTION USING FORECASTING METHODS 
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Earlier audit trail analysers have adopted a wide range of statistical approaches for detecting anomalous 
activity by users. Javitz et. al. (1993: 1-25) provides an outline of several alternative statistical 
approaches that may be applicable for anomaly detection. Ongoing research in these areas has explored 
the application of stochastic models, chi-square statistics, cluster-based learning and fuzzy rules to 
intrusion detection [Luo & Bridges (2000); Ye & Chen (2001); Li & Ye (2002) and Ye, Ehiabor & 
Zhang (2002)]. The MIATA system uses forecasting methods as an efficient approach for anomaly 
detection. 
 
 
6.1 FORECASTING METHOD SELECTION 
 
The fundamental proposition for the success of the MIATA project is that it is feasible to forecast user 
behaviour and to employ such forecasts for categorising user behaviour as normal or anomalous. 
 
Makridakis & Wheelwright (1979) provides a simple framework for classifying forecasting methods. 
Two dimensions are utilised for describing forecasting situations - the type of pattern experienced and 
the type of information available. The type of pattern experienced may be one where history is 
expected to repeat itself, that is where the historical pattern is expected to continue into the future, or 
one where the pattern depends on external factors as well as historical observations. In certain 
forecasting situations, quantitative historical data may be available, such as sales quantities. In other 
situations, only qualitative data may be available, such as executive opinion. 
 
Audit trail analysis is a situation where quantitative information is available. The MIATA system 
incorporates components which record the frequency of user actions and maintain user profiles which 
consist of forecasts of the frequency of user actions on a daily basis. Accordingly, the quantitative 
forecasting methods appear most appropriate for implementation in MIATA.  
 
It is expected that user behaviour will prove to be relatively stable. Users who have been assigned 
specific job descriptions or roles in commercial organisations are likely to have relatively stable 
patterns of system usage. They are likely to use primarily the same workstations, and access primarily 
the same files and programs each day in order to perform their assigned functions. A portion of a user's 
system usage may in fact involve scheduled batch jobs. It is acknowledged that there may be minor 
random deviations from this stable pattern and that there may be routine deviations on a periodic basis, 
such as at the end of the working week, at the end of the month, and at the end of the financial year.  
 
In addition, the privileges assigned to specific users should also reflect their roles. Linked to the 
principle of separation of duties (NCSC 1985), the security principle of least privilege requires that a 
user should have access to the fewest objects (files and programs) needed to perform the functions 
associated with his/her role. An organisation's security system is likely to be most effective if these 
principles are implemented and if so, they also have the effect of stabilising the activity of individual 
system users. Given these arguments, it is proposed that basing forecasting method selection on the 
assumption that the pattern of historical behaviour will repeat itself is quite supportable.  
 
Explanatory or causal methods such as regression assume that the factor to be forecast exhibits a 
cause-effect relationship with one or more independent variables. Such methods determine the form of 
this relationship and use it to forecast future values of the dependent variable given observations of the 
independent variable(s). In contrast, time series methods assume that future values of a factor can be 
predicted merely from historical values of the factor and/or past forecasting errors. Such methods 
determine the pattern in these past values and extrapolate that pattern into the future. 
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In the current context, time series methods offer a practical advantage over explanatory or causal 
methods. In order to generate a forecast, the system requires access only to historical values and/or 
errors. For the MIATA project, the selection of suitable time series forecasting methods should 
consider the nature of the forecasting situation and the characteristics of the alternative methods. The 
MIATA project involves the generation of immediate time horizon forecasts, that is, daily forecasts of 
the frequency of user activity. Such a time horizon reduces severely the impact of data patterns with 
trend, seasonal or cyclical characteristics. Because users are performing stable external organisational 
roles, it is expected also that case studies of actual user behaviour will demonstrate the relative 
stationarity of the data series. Superior accuracy may be achievable using more sophisticated methods 
such as decomposition and ARMA. However, the forecasting situation faced is one where tens of 
thousands of items must be forecast on a daily basis, where data storage requirements must be 
minimised, where development and running costs must be minimised and where complexity must be 
kept to a reasonable level. 
 
Given the above arguments, only simple smoothing methods were recommended for potential 
incorporation in MIATA. These methods are incremental in nature, in that they generate forecasts from 
prior forecasts and errors. Such methods are suitable for immediate time horizon forecasting for 
relatively stationary data series, and impose minimal costs in terms of development, data storage and 
running costs. 
 
 
6.2 THE FEASIBILITY OF FORECASTING USER ACTIVITY 
 
The objective of this experiment was to compare the performance of simple smoothing time series 
methods in forecasting actual user behaviour. This section describes a case study aimed at comparing 
the effectiveness of the selected forecasting methods.  
 
Forecasts were generated using each of six time series methods for each data series. The accuracy of 
each of five smoothing methods - adaptive-response-rate single exponential smoothing (ARRSES), 
Brown's one-parameter linear exponential smoothing (BROWN), simple average (MEAN), single 
moving average of order 5 (MOVAV), and single exponential smoothing (SES) - is evaluated relative 
to each other and to the naive method (NAIVE). For each data series, the method which minimises 
forecasting error was identified. The error measures used in comparing methods were the Mean 
Squared Error (MSE) and the Mean Absolute Percentage Error (MAPE). The "goodness of fit" of the 
more accurate method was then assessed by examining the autocorrelation coefficients (ACFs) of the 
errors. 
 
The case study employed data from a statutory rail authority’s system. The primary processing 
applications are payroll/personnel, wagon tracing, freight accounting, seat/berth reservations, crew 
rostering, locomotive maintenance and supply. There are over 5500 interactive users of the system 
employing over 1700 workstations. 
 
A set of 20 users was selected for monitoring with the assistance of Information Systems Audit staff. 
Users were selected with high volumes of activity and a wide range of action-on-object events. Seven 
weeks' data was collected for the 20 users. After removing weekends and public holidays, user activity 
data for 32 weekdays was available for conducting the forecasting experiment. It was decided early to 
restrict these experiments to week-day data. Relatively few users were active weekend users. 
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Preliminary experiments indicated that better results would be obtained by operating two versions of 
MIATA, one to monitor week-day user activity and another to monitor weekend user activity 
 
A total of 220 data series were chosen for testing the effectiveness of the selected forecasting methods. 
These data series focused on the frequency of individual user's actions on objects. Successful logins, 
late logins and failed logins were collected for each of the 20 users. Each user's failed actions data 
series was also collected. Another 44 data series dealt with individual users' workstation usage - 
successful and failed logins. Sixty-six (66) workstations were used by these 20 users over the 32-day 
period, thereby giving 132 (66 successful logins and 66 failed logins series) potential data series for 
analysis. User-workstation relationships were selected with at least 15 successful logins over the 32 
days (22 of the 66 workstation usage relationships). Both successful logins and failed logins data series 
were analysed for these relationships.  
 
The 20 users attempted to access (read, write, failed read or failed write) 321 files over the 32 days, 
giving 1284 potential data series. File usage data series were selected with at least 20 actions over the 
32 days resulting in 89 data series for analysis. Only 19 different commands executed by these 20 users 
over the 32-day period were monitored by security audit software and recorded in the operating system 
audit trail. Accordingly, relatively few command usage data series were available for analysis. Of the 
38 potential data series (executes and failed executes), only those with at least 5 actions over the 32 
days were selected for analysis (7 data series). 
 
The forecasting experiments were conducted using a spreadsheet - FORECAST. The FORECAST 
spreadsheet performs a simulation of the six forecasting methods for any given data series. The 
following parameters were used: ARRSES - α1=.2 and ß=.2; BROWN - α=.1; SES - α=.2. 
FORECAST simulates the generation of the daily forecasts for each of the six methods, measuring 
daily forecast errors under each method, and printing a summary report. This report lists the data series 
with the resulting forecast errors and summarises the MSE and MAPE for each method. This output 
allows the identification of the method which performs best for each data series, on the basis of each 
measure of forecasting accuracy, and provides the error data to permit an analysis of the "goodness of 
fit" for the superior method. FORECAST also provides the facility to display or print a graphical 
representation of the performance of the methods for a given data series.  
 
Each data series was subdivided into an initialisation set of 5 observations and a test set used in 
comparing forecasting accuracy on the basis of MSE and MAPE. The mean method minimised MSE 
and MAPE for the greatest proportion of the data series. This result suggests that these data series 
exhibit a high degree of stationarity and provides support for the focus on smoothing methods. 
 
The five smoothing methods outperformed the naive method in terms of minimising MSE and MAPE. 
The measures of MSE and MAPE for the smoothing methods did not vary greatly for individual data 
series, causing a significant number of ties when the performance of these methods was ranked. 
Seventy-nine percent (173) of the data series had a MSE range (maximum MSE less minimum MSE 
among the smoothing methods) for the 32 days of less than 5, causing little variation over the five 
methods in standard error, that is, less than 2.2, and little variation in associated confidence intervals 
for a data series among these methods. (MIATA uses each data series' standard error to derive 
confidence intervals).  
 
The randomness of the mean method's forecasting errors was examined in order to test its "goodness of 
fit". For 95 percent confidence, all ACFs should lie within the range (where n=31): 
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.352 + 0 =                      
  
n
1.96 + 0 = I     (1)     95%
 
 
Seventy-six percent (167) of the 220 ACF plots for the forecast errors produced by the mean method 
satisfied this criterion. The mean method provided a "good fit" for 76 percent of the data series. Fifty-
three of the plots showed ACFs lying marginally outside the required interval. The histogram plots for 
the forecast errors were also examined for consistency with a normal distribution with a zero mean and 
absence of consistent observable skewness. Eighty-five percent (188) of the histograms appeared 
normal. Some minor skewness was apparent in 32 of the plots.  
 
Similar results were obtained with two further case studies. These studies involved two different 
organisations (a government service bureau and a tertiary institution) with different computing 
environments. While not conclusive, these results provide support for the application of smoothing 
time series methods to forecasting computer user behaviour and suggest that such forecasts (with their 
associated confidence intervals) can be employed to successfully categorise user behaviour as normal 
or anomalous. 
 
A significant number of data series were excluded from forecasting experiments in the case studies. 
These data series could be categorised as sparse, in that they involved few (such as less than 5) 
observations over the 32-day period. These data series had zero observations on at least 27 of the 32 
week-days. Some comments are provided below concerning the significance of these exclusions and 
the performance of the naive and smoothing forecasting methods on these data series. 
 
Sparse data series, such as failed logins or failed writes, involve a large number of zero observations 
and typically a few non-zero observations of low magnitude. Accordingly, forecasts and standard 
errors (and associated confidence intervals) tend to be close to zero. Minimal variation in forecasting 
accuracy is observable among the six methods. The smoothing methods however appear to consistently 
outperform the naive method. Since the majority of forecast errors (at least 27 of the 32) are close to 
zero, the requirement for the errors to be normally distributed around a mean of zero is satisfied by all 
methods. In cases where the nonzero observations are relatively close to zero, the ACFs satisfy the 
requirements for a good fit. The ACFs however may be distorted where the non-zero observations are 
large in magnitude.  
 
It may be concluded therefore that the smoothing method selected for incorporation in the MIATA 
system on the basis of the above case studies is also suitable for forecasting and detecting anomalous 
levels of activity for these sparse data series. Non-zero observations on a particular day are likely to 
exceed their confidence intervals and be categorised as anomalies. 
 
 
6.3 LIMITATIONS OF FORECASTING TECHNIQUES 
 
A number of potential limitations can be identified where forecasting methods are used in intrusion 
detection systems. The effectiveness of the MIATA system in detecting intrusions depends on its 
ability to identify anomalies. MIATA's forecasting and anomaly detection component derives 
confidence intervals which are compared with actual observations. These confidence intervals are 
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determined with reference to the forecast (Ft), the standard error (SEt) and a specified number of 
standard errors (δ). 
 
The effectiveness of the MIATA system in detecting actual intrusion activity also depends on the 
characteristics of the user targeted by the intruder. Where the target's data series are relatively stable, 
the corresponding confidence intervals will be narrower than if those data series are more variable. 
Additional actions by the intruder who is masquerading as the authorised user may be reported or not 
reported as anomalous depending on the width of those confidence intervals. However, all activity 
attempted by the intruder which is new for the authorised user will be categorised and reported as 
anomalous. 
 
MIATA's auditor reporting component focuses attention on users meeting the activity profiles 
associated with the intrusion methods and on users with larger volumes of anomalous actions. 
However, a more sophisticated intruder may be aware or cautious of potential monitoring activities and 
accordingly concentrate on low volume activity. Given the above discussion, such an intruder may 
target relatively busy users with more variable data series and avoid detection. 
 
Genuine anomalies resulting from random events, special projects or end-of-period tasks may distort 
significantly the confidence intervals for particular data series. These confidence intervals may remain 
high for some time as a result and conceal potential intrusions. Ideally, the auditor could be capable of 
investigating each anomaly and providing input to the system to specify whether it should be 
incorporated in the data series as an observation or omitted to prevent distortion of confidence 
intervals. Such an approach is not considered feasible at this stage. 
 
It is acknowledged that these results are based on samples of user activity over relatively short periods 
of time and are not necessarily generalizable to populations, such as all users or all computer 
installations. However, these encouraging results provide support for the proposition that computer 
user behaviour is forecastable. It is suggested that further case study research should be conducted to 
accumulate further compelling evidence supporting this proposition. 
 
7.0 USER PROFILE DATABASES 
 
This section examines MIATA’s forecasting and anomaly detection component, and its data structures.  
 
 
7.1 THE FORECASTING AND ANOMALY DETECTION COMPONENT 
 
The MIATA system’s forecasting and anomaly detection component performs three main functions on 
a daily basis - generating forecasts for each activity attribute of interest, detecting anomalous behaviour 
in relation to those forecasts, and updating profiles.  
 
A forecast is generated for each activity attribute (such as successful logins) in the profiles. The 
empirical forecasting case studies documented above support the adoption of the mean method for 
incorporation in the MIATA system, imposing minimal storage requirements on the system. The 
ForecastData composite data element consists of five attributes – NoToday, NoDays, Forecast, 
MeanSqError and AnomalyFlag. The NAE recording component uses the NoToday attribute to 
accumulate daily activity frequency, for example, the total number of successful logins for a user today. 
The NoToday (Xt), NoDays (or number of observations - t) and Forecast (Ft) attributes provide 
sufficient data to generate the forecast (Ft+1) for the following day as follows: 
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1+t
X + t F = F      (2)    tt1+t  
 
 The MeanSqError attribute measures the historical MSE for the particular activity and provides a basis 
for the generation of a standard error measure that is used in establishing confidence intervals around 
the new forecast. The AnomalyFlag attribute indicates the outcome of the anomaly detection process 
for a particular activity. 
 
Anomaly detection proceeds once the NAE recording component has processed the current day's audit 
events. The anomaly detection process is distinct from the auditor reporting component of the MIATA 
system. Its purpose is to examine ForecastData for each activity attribute, establish appropriate 
confidence intervals around the forecast, and set the AnomalyFlag attribute to indicate anomalous 
activity where the NoToday value lies outside those intervals. The setting of the AnomalyFlag attribute 
allows the auditor to select various reporting alternatives. The anomaly detection process need be 
performed only once each day. 
 
The anomaly detector applies the following decision rule to each activity attribute in the profiles: 
 
 If Xt lies within confidence intervals, conclude No Anomaly 
 If Xt lies outside confidence intervals, conclude Anomaly 
 
Confidence intervals (Ct) are determined by reference to the Forecast (Ft) and the MeanSqError 
(MSEt) attributes. The auditor sets the range of these intervals by specifying δ, the number of standard 
errors (SEt), to be incorporated. [See Equation (3)]. To illustrate, if the distribution of observations is 
assumed to be normal, a value for δ of 3 defines confidence intervals that include 99.7 per cent of 
observations. Accordingly, an observation may be characterised as anomalous if it lies outside those 
intervals. By definition, new activity by a user is also characterised as anomalous since Ft and SEt have 
zero values.  
MSE = SE
  
  where
  
SE  + F = C     (3)
     
tt
ttt δ
 
 
Two types of errors are feasible with the above decision rule:  (1) being led by the decision rule to 
conclude that an anomaly exists when in fact none does exist - a Type I error; and (2) being led by the 
decision rule to conclude that no anomaly exists when in fact one does exist - a Type II error. 
Generally, confidence intervals can be set to minimise either Type I or Type II errors, but not both. 
Increasing the value of δ widens confidence intervals and reduces the likelihood of incorrectly 
classifying observed behaviour as anomalous. However, it also increases the likelihood of failing to 
detect anomalous behaviour. The anomaly detection component permits the auditor to reduce the 
likelihood of Type I errors by increasing the value of δ. It could be argued that Type II errors, however, 
are the primary concern of the MIATA system - failing to detect anomalous activity.  As a result, a 
more effective anomaly detection mechanism may be achieved by setting a more conservative δ value 
(such as 1) such that a greater proportion of observations are characterised as anomalous. In such a 
case, reporting facilities are required which allow effective use of the auditor's time in investigating 
flagged anomalies. 
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The anomaly detection process also maintains ForecastData for each user's WorkstationAnomalies, 
FileAnomalies and CommandAnomalies. This feature permits the focussing of attention on users with 
large numbers of anomalies, unusual numbers of anomalies for the particular users, as well as 
combinations of workstation-, file- and command-anomalies which may suggest intrusive behaviour. 
 
The last function of this component of the MIATA system is the daily updating of profiles. A set of 
end-of-day procedures are required to reset anomaly flags, generate forecasts for the next day, and 
maintain the profiles. Records are removed that correspond to entities that have been deleted and 
inactive entities, that is, those that represent relationships between users and objects which have 
apparently been discontinued. The auditor may use utilities to monitor storage occupied by the profiles. 
This component of the MIATA system allows the auditor to specify the retention period for such 
inactive entities. This facility along with the selection of the forecasting method help minimise storage 
requirements. 
 
 
7.2 DATA STRUCTURE 
 
The MIATA system accumulates daily frequency data for users and objects, generates forecasts and 
detects anomalous behaviour. A logical data structure is required that focuses on individual users, 
individual objects and relationships between users and objects. 
 
The logical data structure for the profiles in the MIATA system incorporates four principal entities - 
User, Workstation, File and Command. Each of these entities have an identifying attribute - a unique 
name - distinguishing the entity from others of the same type. The other attributes of these entities are 
primarily activity attributes represented by the ForecastData composite data element. Three additional 
entities are included in the data structure - WorkstationUsage, FileAccess and CommandExec - 
concerned with a user's workstation usage, file access and command execution respectively. A 
SystemMetric entity is also defined for maintaining activity data for the entire system, namely failed 
logins, failed reads, failed writes, failed executions and failed actions. 
 
Figure 2 shows the data elements for the entities in the MIATA data structure. A distinct record type 
(and databased table) is required for each entity type. The key of the record type in each case is its 
identifying data element(s) (shown underlined). Data elements shown in bold are represented by the 
ForecastData composite data element and are composed of its simple component data elements.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
8.0 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The results from this project support the proposal that developing a machine-independent audit trail 
analyzer is feasible. This MIATA project has demonstrated that machine-independent audit trails are 
feasible, that an anomaly-detection approach to intrusion detection using time series forecasting 
methods can produce acceptable results and that the data structures for MIATA system can impose 
minimal storage requirements. Such a system will be an invaluable aid to an auditor in detecting 
potential computer intrusions and monitoring user activity. The system will serve as an attention 
directing tool for the auditor faced otherwise with masses of low-level system activity data and limited 
reporting facilities.  
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Development of an effective tool for analysing audit trails can assist auditors in monitoring the security 
of their clients’ systems. The audit trails provide a feedback mechanism on the operation of the security 
policies implemented on these systems. Without the availability of a monitoring device such as 
MIATA, the auditor’s focus is merely on reviewing the preventive mechanisms for enforcing security. 
The MIATA system facilitates the development of a framework for audit trail analysis which can be 
applied consistently on a daily basis. Such an analysis may identify objects requiring better protection, 
users requiring disciplinary action and users needing training, and may suggest areas where 
improvements in the client's security policies are required. The MIATA system will be extremely 
valuable in organisations with multi-platform environments, since a single machine-independent tool 
can provide a consistent basis for analysing audit trails from different hardware environments.  
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Figure 1  Model of the MIATA  System
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 Figure 2 Mapping of Data Elements to Entities 
 
 
 Entity: User   Entity: WorkstationUsage 
 
 UserName   UserName + WorkstationName 
 Logins    Logins 
 LateLogins   FailedLogins 
 FailedLogins   LastUse 
 FailedActions 
 WorkstationAnomalies 
 FileAnomalies  Entity: FileAccess 
 CommandAnomalies  UserName + FileName 
     Reads 
     Writes 
 Entity: Workstation  FailedReads 
     FailedWrites 
 WorkstationName  DeletionMarker 
 FailedLogins   LastAccess 
 
 
 Entity: File   Entity: CommandExec 
 
 FileName   UserName + CommandName 
 Reads    Executes 
 Writes    FailedExecutes 
 FailedReads   LastExecute 
 FailedWrites 
 DeletionMarker 
 LastAccess   Entity: SystemMetric 
 
     MetricName 
 Entity: Command  Activity 
 
 CommandName 
 Executes   Entity: AuditEvent 
 FailedExecutes 
 LastExecute   UserName 
     WorkstationName 
     ObjectName 
     Date 
     Time 
     ActionCode 
     EventStatus 
     NewName 
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Table 1  Summary of Intruder Profiles 
ANOMALOUS   
ACTIVITY 
PASSWORD 
GUESSING 
MASQUER-
ADING 
BROWSING 
LOGINS          X      
LATE LOGINS      X     X 
FAILED 
LOGINS 
    X    
FAILED 
ACTIONS 
     X     X 
WORKSTATIO
N USAGE 
    X     X  
FILE USAGE      X     X 
FAILED FILE 
ACCESS 
     X     X 
COMMAND 
USAGE 
     X     X 
FAILED 
COMMAND 
USAGE 
     X     X 
 
 
